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The recent ‘Romanow’ and ‘Kirby’ inquiries into the Canadian 
health care system recommended a publicly funded catastrophic 
prescription drug insurance program to protect Canadians from 
potentially ruinous drug costs.  While the Romanow commission 
was not specific about the nature of such a program, the Kirby 
commission recommended that household prescription drug expenses 
be capped at 3% of total household income, or $1,500 per 
household member, whichever is lower, with government picking up 
the remainder.  Using recent survey data on household spending, 
we estimate how the program would assist households of different 
means and ages, residing in different regions of the country.  
We find that, despite the fact that senior and low income non-
senior households are the primary beneficiaries of provincial 
government drug plans, average subsidies would be over 4 times 
higher for these households than for all other (non-senior, non-
indigent) households.  A small percentage of other households 
would be among the largest beneficiaries of the program.  
Program benefits are typically larger in provinces with less 
generous public coverage and tend to benefit lower income 
households.  Program costs are estimated to be at least $461 
million annually, although reductions in out of pocket drug 
spending will reduce medical tax credits and thereby increase 
tax revenues by at least $80 million.  Program costs appeared to 
be very sensitive to increased household drug spending that 
might result from the program introduction. 
 
   1
Introduction 
 
Under the terms of the 1984 Canada Health Act, provincial 
governments that fail to fully subsidize the cost of ‘medically 
necessary’ physician and hospital-based services are subject to 
penalties, in the form of withheld federal transfer payments 
(Flood and Choudry 2002).  The Canada Health Act does not 
mandate the public subsidy of prescription drugs and this has 
resulted in a relatively small public share of total drug 
spending – 35.2% in 2000 (Canadian Institute for Health 
Information 2002), compared with the public share of spending on 
physicians’ services (98.6%) and hospital-based services 
(91.3%).  Provincial government drug plans account for the 
majority (86%; CIHI 2002) of the public spending on prescription 
drugs used outside of hospitals.   
 
The absence of national standards has resulted in substantial 
variation in several dimensions of the comprehensiveness of 
provincial government drug coverage: 1) the drugs listed on the 
provincial formulary – i.e. drugs that are reimbursed; 2) the 
time it takes a drug plan to list a new drug on its formulary 
(Rx&D 2003); 3) restrictions on the reimbursement of listed 
drugs, such as the common requirement that costly drugs will not 
be reimbursed unless therapy on a less costly drug is attempted 
first (Gregoire et al 2001); 4) the drug plans’ share of the 
cost of listed drugs; and 5) the population eligible for subsidy 
(Grootendorst 2002).   
 
With regard to dimensions 4) and 5), the provincial government 
plans provide uniformly comprehensive coverage for the indigent 
(recipients of social assistance benefits), and residents of 
long-term care facilities.  Provincial subsidies for seniors 
(those 65 years and older) and especially the non-indigent, non-
senior populations vary substantially.  Grootendorst et al 
(2003) find up to a 12-fold variation among the provinces in the 
charges faced by seniors with similar income and drug use.  
There is no provincial subsidy for the prescription drug use by 
the non-indigent, non-senior population in the Atlantic 
provinces.  BC, Saskatchewan, Manitoba, and Ontario offer 
‘catastrophic’ drug coverage to this group, reimbursing drug 
costs in excess of an income-contingent deductible.  Residents 
of Alberta and Quebec have the option of purchasing government-
subsidized coverage with income-contingent premiums but with 
smaller deductibles than in the other provinces (Grootendorst   2
2002).
1  Although the federal government share of drug 
expenditures is small (subsidies are limited to aboriginals, 
active and retired military, and a few smaller groups), the 
federal government and several provincial governments provide 
income tax relief to households with large drug and other 
medical expenses.  
 
Individuals with insufficient public coverage do have recourse 
to private insurance markets.  Coverage available for individual 
subscribers, however, is not comprehensive
2; this is likely due 
to information problems in this market.  Data from the Final 
Report of the Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, 
Science and Technology chaired by Senator Michael Kirby 
(hereafter the ‘Kirby report’) indicates that approximately 
600,000 Canadians, all based in the Atlantic region, had no drug 
coverage from either public or private sources (Table 7.5 of 
Kirby, 2002).  A further 5% of Canadians (most from the Atlantic 
region) had coverage that would require that they pay at least 
10% of total drug expenses of $20,000.   
 
Two recent inquiries into the state of the Canadian health care 
system have argued for additional publicly funded catastrophic 
drug coverage, in light of the increasingly important role of 
pharmaceuticals in the management of health problems, the fact 
that some of these drugs are very expensive, and the apparent 
lack of coverage against potentially ruinous drug costs.  Both 
the Kirby report and the Final Report of the Commission on the 
Future of Health Care in Canada, chaired by Roy Romanow (Romanow 
2002) called on the federal government to transfer funds to 
provincial governments that committed to expanding the level of 
drug insurance coverage to their residents.  The two reports 
differ, however, in the recommended expansion of public 
coverage.  Romanow proposed that this matter be resolved through 
negotiations between the federal and provincial governments, 
whereas Kirby’s recommendations were specific: To be eligible 
for federal assistance, private and provincial drug plans would 
need to cap household prescription drug expenses at 3% of total 
                                                 
1 Residents of Quebec who do not purchase government coverage must purchase 
private coverage with minimum coverage standards (maximum of $750 out of 
pocket costs including premiums annually). 
2 For example, at time of writing the most comprehensive drug coverage offered 
by a major insurer, Liberty Health, to individual subscribers imposed a 
$4,350 cap on total benefits payable annually. See:  
http://www.benefitsonline.ca/individual/Secure/LibertyDetails.htm#DrugPlus.  
To mitigate adverse selection, more comprehensive coverage is likely provided 
to those for whom coverage is required for membership in some organization, 
such as unions and student associations.     3
household income, or $1,500 per household member, whichever is 
lower. 
 
In this paper we present evidence to inform the likely effects 
of implementing a Kirby-style publicly funded catastrophic drug 
insurance scheme.  First, using recent, nationally 
representative data on household-level prescription drug 
spending, we estimate the proportion of households with 
sufficiently large drug costs such that they would qualify for 
some financial assistance under the proposed scheme.  We also 
estimate how much financial assistance such qualifying 
households would receive.  We provide estimates for Canada as a 
whole, and within each province, for each of the three types of 
households that likely differ in both their source of drug 
coverage (provincial government coverage for seniors and the 
indigent, private insurance for the non-senior, non-indigent) 
and the comprehensiveness of such coverage.  Existing studies 
have estimated the proportion of Canadians who lack insurance 
coverage against catastrophic drug costs, but there is little 
evidence on how existing public and private drug coverage 
arrangements affect households’ catastrophic drug expenditure 
burdens.  This study assesses the distributional impact of the 
proposed program between households currently given provincial 
drug benefits and those that are not. 
 
Our second objective is to shed light on the effects of 
household characteristics, including household income, on the 
amount of assistance received under the proposed program.  A 
priori, it is unclear whether the program would preferentially 
benefit low income households.  While higher income households 
have more generous insurance coverage (Grootendorst and Levine, 
2001) so that their out of pocket expenditures are lower, poorer 
households are more likely to qualify for provincial coverage 
for the indigent.  And while higher income households are 
required to pay more out of pocket under the proposed program 
(3% of household income), the proposed subsidy formula includes 
a maximum household expenditure limit, irrespective of income, 
of $1,500 per household member.  Finally, even though higher-
income households tend to be healthier, out of pocket drug 
spending tends to increase with income (Alan et al 2002).  This 
is perhaps because of affordability but perhaps also because 
higher-income individuals with a particular health condition are 
better able to access prescribers or have heightened awareness 
of therapeutic options.  To investigate this, we estimate models 
of the effect of household income on the probability that the 
household qualifies for some assistance, and among qualifying 
households, the effect of income on the amount of assistance   4
received.  These models also control for household age, labour 
force participation, province of residence and other variables 
likely correlated with assistance and income.  The estimates of 
the effect of province of residence on assistance obtained from 
this model provide information on how the comprehensiveness of 
public or private drug coverage in the province would affect 
assistance under the proposed program, while controlling for the 
factors that affect the uptake of such coverage and total drug 
expenditures (such as income and age). 
 
Our third objective is to estimate the expected cost to 
government of implementing the Kirby proposal.  We consider this 
estimate in the context of existing government tax credits on 
medical expenses.  We also consider the sensitivity of the 
estimate to the possibility that households might increase drug 
consumption after receiving coverage for catastrophic drug 




We use data from the Statistics Canada 2000 Survey of Household 
Spending (SHS).  The SHS collects information on annual 
household level income, spending on various goods and services, 
including prescription drugs, as well as information on 
household living arrangements (such as marital status, age and 
sex of children living in the household).  The SHS data are 
intended to be representative of all persons living in private 
households, and therefore exclude those residing in long-term 
care facilities, hospitals, aboriginal reserves, and penal 
institutions.  The survey is a stratified multi-stage sample, 
and lower population regions such as the Atlantic provinces are 
over-sampled.  We use sampling weights provided by Statistics 
Canada to ensure descriptive statistics are nationally 
representative.  Face-to-face interviews are conducted in 
January, February and March to collect expenditure and income 
information for the previous calendar year (the 2000 data were 
collected in the first quarter of 2001).  Households which 
formed during 2000, for whom only partial year expenditure and 
income information were available, were excluded, leaving data 
on 14,250 households.  To protect confidentiality, the province 
of residence of 163 households was masked.  These masked 
observations were dropped for analyses requiring knowledge of 
province of residence, leaving a sample of 14,087 households. 
 
For the purposes of delineating those who are routine 
beneficiaries of the provincial drug plans, we defined 3 
household types: seniors, low income and others.  Senior   5
households are those in which either the head or spouse is 65 
years or older.  The low income are defined as the non-senior 
households that receive at least 50% of their income from 
government transfers (such as welfare payments).  The ‘other’ 
category includes all other non-senior, non-indigent households.   
 
The assistance that the h
th household would receive under the 
proposed program, denoted as yh, was calculated as:  
 
yh = max(rxdrugh - min(0.03*grossyh, 1500*nmembh),0) 
 
where rxdrugh, grossyh and nmembh are household h’s total 
spending on prescription drugs, total gross income and household 
size, respectively.  Some of our analysis is done by calculating 
yh with the year 2000 data and tabulating that against province 
of residence and household type.  However to examine potential 
distribution effects across households while controlling for 
household characteristics (denoted by xh), a two-part model was 
used.  This consists of a probit model of the probability that a 
household with characteristics xh would qualify for assistance:  
 
prob[yh>0|xh]           (1) 
 
and a model of the average amount of assistance that would 
accrue to qualifying households with characteristics xh: 
 
E[yh|xh,yh>0]             (2) 
 
The product of (1) and (2) produces the average assistance to 
all households with characteristics xh: 
 
E[yh|xh] = prob[yh>0|xh]×E[yh|xh,yh>0]      (3) 
 
To account for the strong possibility of right skewness in the 
distribution of assistance among qualifying households, we model 
yh using a log-linear specification: 
 
ln yh = xh
Tβ + εh, for yh  >  0        (4) 
 
where β is the set of parameters to be estimated and ε are the 
unobserved differences in assistance accruing to qualifying 
households that remain after conditioning on xh.  Retrieving the 
average y’s (instead of ln y) from (4) requires knowledge of the 
conditional distribution of each εh.   
 
E[yh|xh,yh>0] =  E[exp(xh
Tβ + εh)|xh,yh>0] 
   =  exp(xh
Tβ)×E[exp(εh|xh,yh>0)]   6
 
To estimate this model, we use the year 2000 values for xh and 
yh, assuming for the moment that these would be unchanged by the 
introduction of a federal catastrophic drug program. (We address 
the issue of behavioural responses later in the paper.)  For 
E[exp(εh|xh,yh>0)], we assumed that the distribution of the ε 
varies systematically by province and used Duan’s non-parametric 
estimator (Duan 1983), which in this case is the province-
specific average exponentiated residual. 
 
After estimating the equations (1)-(3), we predicted the 
assistance accruing to households with different levels of 
income, while holding all other characteristics fixed at 
population means.  Confidence intervals were produced using the 
bootstrap method: Parameter estimates and predictions for all 
three equations were generated from each of 1,000 bootstrap 
samples (where each sample was randomly chosen with replacement 
from the original sample with number of observations set at the 
size of the original estimation sample), and the 2.5
th and 97.5
th 
percentiles of the prediction distribution for each equation 
formed the estimates of the 95% confidence interval.   
 
The same methods were used to predict how assistance varied by 
province of residence.  When making province-specific 
predictions, we used the province-specific estimate of the 
average exponentiated residual.  When making income-specific 
predictions, we used the weighted average of the province-
specific estimates of the average exponentiated residual, with 
province-specific weights set at the estimated proportion of 
households in the population residing in the province. 
 
Turning to our choice of xh variables, to allow for non-linear 
effects of income on the probability or amount of assistance 
received, we created 5 variables indicating to which of the 5 
quintiles of after tax household income the household belonged.  
Several other variables thought to affect both income and 
assistance were also included in the model.  To account for the 
influence of existing drug coverage on out of pocket costs, we 
included indicators of the number of full time earners in the 
household (0, 1, 2 or more) and an indicator of whether the head 
was either married or living in a common law relationship.  To 
account for the medical need for drugs, we included household 
demographic factors, including indicators of the age of the 
household head (under 30 years, 30-44, 45-64, 65-74, and 75 and 
older), number of children under 18 (0, 1-2, 3 or more) and the 
number of other household members, besides the head and his/her 
spouse if applicable (0, 1-2, 3 or more).  Recall that   7
households can qualify for the proposed subsidy by virtue of 
what we call the ‘income rule’, i.e., spending more than 3% of 
household income on prescription drugs, or the ‘per capita 
rule’, spending more than $1,500 per household member.  The 
indicators of household size and marital status also control for 
the amount of assistance received via the per capita rule.  
 
We estimated these models separately for senior and non-senior 
households.  (We initially attempted to estimate separate models 
for each of the three household types identified earlier, but 
there were insufficient observations in the low income group to 
generate reliable estimates.)  The variables indicating the 
number of full time income earners, the number of children and 
other household members were removed from the seniors’ models as 





Assistance by province of residence and household type  
 
Before we use the two-part model described in the previous 
section, we estimate the assistance accruing to households under 
Senator Kirby’s proposed catastrophic drug plan directly from 
the raw data.  Overall, 5.8% of Canadian residential households 
would qualify for some assistance under the proposed program, 
but there is substantial variation by province of residence and 
household type (Table 1).  Eligibility rates range from 3.4% in 
Ontario and 3.8% in BC to 13% in PEI and 15% in Saskatchewan.  
Similarly, eligibility rates are much higher for low income 
households (which comprise 8.2% of all households) and senior 
households (21.4% of all households), than for all other 
households (70.4% of all households).  Inspection of eligibility 
rates among the individual cells reveals dramatic differences: 
42.3% of Saskatchewan seniors qualify, compared to just 1.9% of 
other households residing in Ontario.   
 
Most eligible households (87.9%), irrespective of province or 
household type, would qualify for coverage by virtue of the 
income rule, as opposed to the per capita rule (Table 2).  The 
proportion qualifying via the income rule was highest for 
seniors (92.2%) and low income earners (89%) and lowest for 
other households (78.2%).  There was modest inter-provincial 
                                                 
3 The p-values associated with the likelihood ratio test statistics that these 
variables were jointly insignificant in the probit model of probability of 
assistance and the regression model of level of assistance were 0.56 and 
0.86, respectively.   8
variation: 94.6% of eligible Quebec households would qualify via 
the income rule, whereas 81.6% of Saskatchewan residents would. 
 
Table 1: Proportion of households qualifying for proposed 
catastrophic drug coverage, by province of residence and 
household type  
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
province of          |                 household type                 
residence            |     senior  low income       other       Total 
---------------------+----------------------------------------------- 
        newfoundland |      0.246       0.067       0.040       0.088 
prince edward island |      0.302       0.251       0.052       0.128 
         nova scotia |      0.119       0.180       0.028       0.064 
       new brunswick |      0.164       0.124       0.038       0.076 
              quebec |      0.276       0.080       0.021       0.082 
             ontario |      0.053       0.122       0.019       0.034 
            manitoba |      0.286       0.049       0.033       0.097 
        saskatchewan |      0.423       0.092       0.047       0.150 
             alberta |      0.196       0.188       0.020       0.057 
    british columbia |      0.052       0.121       0.024       0.038 
                     |  
               Total |      0.156       0.107       0.023       0.058 
---------------------------------------------------------------------  
Source: 2000 Survey of Household Spending.  Note: Households with 
unknown province of residence dropped.  Sampling weights used. 
   9
Table 2: Proportion of households qualifying for proposed 
catastrophic drug coverage via the household income rule and not 
the per capita rule, by province of residence and household type 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
province of          |                 household type                 
residence            |     senior  low income       other       Total 
---------------------+----------------------------------------------- 
        newfoundland |      0.861       0.898       0.930       0.886 
prince edward island |      0.905       0.832       1.000       0.919 
         nova scotia |      0.896       0.888       0.852       0.881 
       new brunswick |      0.920       0.891       0.939       0.921 
              quebec |      0.975       0.960       0.818       0.946 
             ontario |      0.839       0.809       0.699       0.774 
            manitoba |      0.891       1.000       0.861       0.888 
        saskatchewan |      0.819       0.833       0.801       0.816 
             alberta |      0.945       1.000       0.624       0.861 
    british columbia |      0.922       0.937       0.873       0.904 
                     |  
               Total |      0.922       0.890       0.782       0.879 
---------------------------------------------------------------------  
Source: 2000 Survey of Household Spending.  Note: Households with 
unknown province of residence dropped. Sampling weights used. 
Income rule: qualification for the subsidy by virtue of spending more 
than 3% of household income on prescription drugs. 
Per capita rule: qualification for the subsidy by virtue of spending 
more than $1,500 per household member. 
 
 
How much new money would the Kirby plan transfer annually to 
households that qualify for the proposed catastrophic drug 
coverage?  The mean transfer is $713, but most qualifying 
households would receive an amount less than this: half would 
receive $330 or less and 75% would receive under $821.  A small 
fraction, however, would receive very large transfers: the top 
1% would receive an amount in excess of $5,450.  These ‘outlier’ 
households clearly have a large influence on mean transfers.  To 
analyze transfers to qualifying households by province and 
household type, we therefore present mean transfers (Table 3) 
and median transfers (Table 4), the latter statistic being a 
more robust measure of central tendency in this case.   
 
There is substantial variation in transfers by household type.  
Whereas seniors had the highest eligibility rates of all three 
household types (16%), mean transfers to eligible households are 
the lowest: $571 versus $904 for low income and $907 for other 
households.  Median transfers to eligible households followed 
roughly the same pattern, although the influence of outlier 
households, approximated by the ratio of the mean to median   10
transfer, was highest for other households.  Mean and median 
transfers varied by province as well. 
 
 
Table 3: Mean catastrophic drug subsidies to qualifying 
households, by province of residence, and household type 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
province of          |                 household type                 
residence            |     senior  low income       other       Total 
---------------------+----------------------------------------------- 
        newfoundland |      1,027       1,153         882       1,009 
prince edward island |        816         694         830         800 
         nova scotia |        735       1,116       1,253         990 
       new brunswick |        640         641         601         628 
              quebec |        408         526         790         487 
             ontario |      1,066       1,433       1,035       1,145 
            manitoba |        495         488         698         541 
        saskatchewan |        743         652         813         753 
             alberta |        364         353       1,499         670 
    british columbia |        593         364         549         523 
                     |  
               Total |        571         904         907         713 
---------------------------------------------------------------------  
Source: 2000 Survey of Household Spending.  Note: Households with 
unknown province of residence dropped.  Sampling weights used. 
 
 
Table 4: Median catastrophic drug plan subsidies to qualifying 
households, by province of residence, and household type 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
province of          |                 household type                 
residence            |     senior  low income       other       Total 
---------------------+----------------------------------------------- 
        newfoundland |        610         556         820         660 
prince edward island |        540         168         400         510 
         nova scotia |        420         470         550         470 
       new brunswick |        282         324         390         300 
              quebec |        270         310         280         270 
             ontario |        278         525         672         444 
            manitoba |        264         394         390         305 
        saskatchewan |        480         673         650         510 
             alberta |        260         194         950         290 
    british columbia |        330         200         270         266 
                     |  
               Total |        300         430         410         330 
---------------------------------------------------------------------  
Source: 2000 Survey of Household Spending.  Note: Households with 
unknown province of residence dropped.  Sampling weights used. 
   11
The mean new subsidy to all Canadian households from the 
proposed program would be $39, but again there would be large 
differences in subsidies depending on province of residence and 
household type (Table 5).  Households in the richer provinces, 
BC, Alberta and Ontario would receive below average subsidies, 
whereas Saskatchewan, PEI and Newfoundland would receive 
transfers well above the national average.  Despite the fact 
that senior and low income non-senior households have 
traditionally been the primary beneficiaries of provincial 
government drug plans, average subsidies would be over 4 times 
higher for these households ($85 and $87 respectively) than for 
all other (non-senior, non-indigent) households ($20).  This 
difference is due largely to differences in eligibility rates: 
16% of senior and 11% of low income households would be eligible 
for assistance, whereas only 2.3% of other households would be.   
 
Table 5: Mean catastrophic drug plan subsidies to all households 




province of          |                 household type                 
residence            |     senior  low income       other       Total 
---------------------+----------------------------------------------- 
        newfoundland |        243          77          35          87 
prince edward island |        247         161          43         101 
         nova scotia |         86         185          35          61 
       new brunswick |        105          80          21          47 
              quebec |        107          38          16          38 
             ontario |         53         158          20          37 
            manitoba |        140          24          22          52 
        saskatchewan |        306          60          37         110 
             alberta |         67          63          27          35 
    british columbia |         29          33          12          18 
                     |  
               Total |         85          87          20          39 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: 2000 Survey of Household Spending.  Note: Households with 
unknown province of residence dropped.  Sampling weights used. 
 
 
Partial effects of household income and province of residence  
 
We now use the two-part model of the subsidies a household would 
receive under the proposed catastrophic drug program.  This 
allows us to ‘control’ for the xh variables age, marital status, 
family composition and province of residence as we examine the 
redistribution across income groups (and similarly to control 
for other xh influences as we examine redistribution across   12
households in different provinces.)  Using this model, predicted 
probabilities of assistance, amount of assistance to both 
eligible households and to all households (irrespective of 
eligibility) by quintiles of household income and province of 
residence are provided in Tables 6 (seniors) and 7 (non-
seniors).  The regression estimates used to generate these 
predictions are presented in Appendices 1 and 2.  The 
heterogeneity in levels of assistance to households residing in 
the different provinces remains after conditioning on income, 
household composition, marital status and the number of full 
time earners.  Mean subsidies to seniors are highest in 
Saskatchewan, PEI and Newfoundland, and lowest in BC, Ontario 
and Alberta; the ratio of highest to lowest provincial mean 
subsidy is almost 15.  This pattern of subsidy is consistent 
with relative generosity of the provincial plans – the largest 
subsidies would flow to seniors residing the provinces with the 
largest levels of cost sharing.   
 
Although the mean subsidies to eligible senior households from 
the proposed catastrophic drug program increase with income 
quintile, the probability of eligibility decreases markedly with 
income so that on net the proposed program would benefit less 
well off seniors.  This pattern emerges despite the element of 
low-income targeting present in most provincial programs for 
seniors. 
 
Rates of assistance to non-senior households are typically less 
than one half rates received by comparable senior households.  
This appears to be due to relatively low eligibility rates among 
non-seniors; amounts of assistance accruing to eligible 
households tend to be the same or larger for non-senior 
households.  Among Saskatchewan residents, for instance, 2% of 
non-senior households would qualify compared to 39% of senior 
households; subsidies to qualifying households are comparable 
($843 for seniors vs. $873 for non-seniors).  Again, rates of 
assistance to non-seniors vary by province with Nova Scotia, 
Ontario and PEI receiving the largest household subsidies and 
Quebec, BC and Manitoba receiving the lowest.  With the 
exception of Ontario, these results can be explained by the 
availability of provincial drug coverage for this group.   
 
The pattern of subsidies by income quintile for non-seniors 
resembles the pattern observed for seniors, although the income 
gradient in mean transfers appears to be steeper for non-
seniors.  This pattern is somewhat surprising given the element 
of low-income targeting present in most provincial programs.   13
 
Table 6: Predicted probability of assistance under the proposed catastrophic drug plan 
for senior households with 95% confidence intervals, by province of residence and 
quintile of household after-tax income.   
 
Seniors sample          
Prob. of Transfer (p)  Amount of Transfer (l)  Total Transfer (pxl)  Province of 












Newfoundland  0.21 0.16 0.26  1,018 741 1,311 214  137  292 
PEI  0.25 0.18 0.31  970  634 1,318 240  141  352 
Nova Scotia  0.12 0.09 0.16  794  484 1,163  97  51  150 
New Brunswick  0.13 0.09 0.17  712  472 1,038  92  50  144 
Quebec  0.26  0.21  0.31  487 372 611 128  93  168 
Ontario  0.06 0.04 0.09  1,168 338 2,396  75  20  154 
Manitoba  0.26  0.22  0.31  546 405 696 143 100 192 
Saskatchewan  0.39 0.34 0.44  843  677 1,004 329  255  405 
Alberta  0.19 0.14 0.23  418  316  540  78  51  108 
BC  0.05 0.03 0.07  484  269  702  22  10  37 
Prob. of Transfer (p)  Amount of Transfer (l)  Total Transfer (pxl)  Household 












Quintile 1  0.22  0.19  0.25  577 365 823 128  76  184 
Quintile 2  0.15 0.12 0.17  702  462 1,015 103  62  151 
Quintile 3  0.07 0.05 0.10  619  351  957  46  23  77 
Quintile 4  0.04 0.02 0.07  1,279 621 2,423  58  20  130 
Quintile 5  0.01 0.00 0.03  1,821 458 4,444  20  1  88 
 
Note: The estimated regression models used to generate these predictions are presented in Appendix 
1.   14
Table 7: Predicted probability of assistance under the proposed catastrophic drug plan 
for non-senior households, with 95% confidence intervals, by province of residence and 
quintile of household after-tax income.   
 
Non-seniors sample          
Prob. of Transfer (p)  Amount of Transfer (l)  Total Transfer (pxl)  Province of 












Newfoundland  0.02 0.01 0.02  1,069 656 1,658  18  9  31 
PEI  0.04 0.02 0.05  890  484 1,369  31  13  53 
Nova Scotia  0.03 0.02 0.04  1,285 820 1,862  33  17  51 
New Brunswick  0.02 0.01 0.03  735  471 1,113  15  8  24 
Quebec  0.01 0.01 0.01  918  448 1,482  9  4  16 
Ontario  0.02 0.02 0.03  1,644 918 2,638  40  20  64 
Manitoba  0.02 0.01 0.03  704  437 1,103  12  6  21 
Saskatchewan  0.02 0.02 0.03  873  540 1,277  21  11  34 
Alberta  0.02 0.01 0.03  1,527 731 2,342  32  12  54 
BC  0.02 0.01 0.02  613  346  943  10  4  17 
Prob. of Transfer (p)  Amount of Transfer (l)  Total Transfer (pxl)  Household 












Quintile 1  0.11 0.08 0.13  1,044 703 1,412 111  69  159 
Quintile 2  0.04 0.03 0.05  1,041 698 1,418  45  26  65 
Quintile 3  0.03 0.02 0.03  1,121 700 1,571  30  16  44 
Quintile 4  0.01 0.01 0.01  1,090 638 1,798  11  5  20 
Quintile 5  0.00 0.00 0.01  1,323 562 2,636  5  2  11 
 
Note: The estimated regression models used to generate these predictions are presented in Appendix 
2. 
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Program cost estimates 
 
Using tabulations from the raw data (as opposed to the two-part 
model) and assuming that total drug expenditures remain 
unchanged, we estimate the implementation of the proposed 
catastrophic drug insurance program to the estimated 11,362,290 
households in Canada during the year 2000 would require the 
federal government to spend $462 million (Table 8).  This 
estimate is close to the $500 million cost estimate produced in 
the Kirby report.  Note this estimate assumes that the 
provincial governments do not adjust their programs to take 
advantage of the federal program.  If they do, the cost to the 
federal government will be higher.  However, provided total drug 
expenditures and private coverage do not change, the $462 
million is still a valid estimate of the total incremental cost 
of the proposal to all levels of government. 
    
 
Table 8: Subsidies to all households (in $ millions), by 
province of residence, and household type 
 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
province of          |                 household type                 
residence            |     senior  low income       other       Total 
---------------------+----------------------------------------------- 
      masked records |        9.2         1.6         7.6        18.4 
        newfoundland |        9.3         3.1         3.8        16.2 
prince edward island |        2.8         0.7         1.4         5.0 
         nova scotia |        6.8         6.1         8.0        20.9 
       new brunswick |        6.7         2.3         3.8        12.8 
              quebec |       66.8        11.6        31.4       109.9 
             ontario |       46.4        48.3        59.0       153.7 
            manitoba |       14.0         0.6         6.1        20.8 
        saskatchewan |       29.6         1.7         8.9        40.2 
             alberta |       12.6         2.0        22.4        37.0 
    british columbia |        9.5         4.0        13.2        26.6 
                     |  
               Total |      213.7        82.0       165.8       461.5 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: 2000 Survey of Household Spending.  All households included, 
including those with masked province of residence.  Sampling weights 
used. 
   
 
A defect of this approach is that we have made no allowance for 
the federal tax credit program.  In 2000 tax relief was 17% of 
the difference between total eligible medical expenses and the 
lesser of $1678 and 3% of adjusted personal income.  Hence if 
Kirby catastrophic drug coverage had existed in 2000, household   16
medical expenses would have been lower and there would have been 
a revenue offset to the federal government of up to 17% of $462 
million or approximately $80 million.
4  As part of this analysis, 
we have also estimated at $180 million the federal tax revenue 
offset if, as part of the reform, pharmaceutical drugs were made 
ineligible for the tax credit program.
5 
 
Finally we estimated the sensitivity of the cost of a 
catastrophic drug program if households increased their drug 
consumption in response to the introduction of the program.  We 
did this simply by increasing the expenditures in the raw data 
by the appropriate factor and redoing our cost calculation.  
There is uncertainty over both the increase in household drug 
consumption due to the new program and the baseline level of 
program expenditures, so that cost estimates are likely to be 
                                                 
4 Virtually all of the expenses eligible for credit would be covered by the 
proposed program. However the revenue offset would unlikely be the full $80 
million because the credit is nonrefundable. Take up of the credit is also 
incomplete whereas we have assumed take up of the new program would be 100%. 
The reduction of eligible medical expenses would also provide a revenue 
windfall to the provincial governments.  While an exact estimate would be 
complex, a common and reasonably accurate rule of thumb is to assume that the 
provincial offset would be about half the federal government revenue offset.  
5 Because the SHS data is on a household basis yet the tax system is 
individually-based, we focus on households with only one adult age 18 or 
older.  For such households we can estimate the tax credit with and without 
the inclusion of prescription drugs. (In this step we ignore the issue that 
the SHS data is on a calendar year basis while the tax credit can be claimed 
for any 12 month period.  We also estimate the adjusted personal income for 
the tax credit calculation as gross income less registered pension plan 
deductions, childcare and moving expenses: some other possible deductions are 
not included because of lack of data.)  Our resulting calculation is that for 
lone adult households, eliminating the tax credit for prescription drugs 
would increase federal tax revenues by $60 million (and that this credit 
reduction would have a negligible effect on the cost of the Kirby plan). 
Given that the Kirby plan for lone adult households alone would cost $150 
million or about one-third of the complete Kirby plan, this suggests an 
estimate of about 3×$60 million or $180 million for all households. 
 
We verify this calculation by another method. Canada Customs and Revenue 
Agency data indicates that the allowable portion of medical expenses claimed 
was just over $4 billion.  Ignoring the nonrefundable aspect, this would 
indicate tax credits of .17×$4 billion or $680 million.  Pharmaceutical drug 
expenditures are about 21% of medical expenses in the SHS data, suggesting an 
estimate of the tax credit for pharmaceutical drugs alone of about .21×$680 
million or $143 million, roughly similar to our other estimate.   
 
We also note again that these are federal government revenue offsets and that 
there would be an additional provincial government revenue offset of probably 
half the federal government figure.   17
imprecise.
6  One finding, however, was remarkably robust: 
irrespective of the assumed percentage increase in drug 
consumption (1%, 5% or 10%), the resulting increase in program 
costs was approximately double.  For example, if consumption 
increased by 10 per cent, we predict that program costs would 
increase by 20.6 percent.  This appears to be due to 
disproportionate increases in the number of households that 
would become eligible for program benefits after an increase in 




In this paper we estimated how the introduction of the federally 
funded catastrophic drug insurance program advocated by the 
Standing Senate Committee on Social Affairs, Science and 
Technology would assist households of different means and ages, 
residing in different regions of the country.  Our results 
provide evidence that assistance would vary along each of these 
dimensions, and sometimes in unexpected ways. 
 
First, despite the fact that senior and low income non-senior 
households are the primary beneficiaries of provincial 
government drug plans, average subsidies would be over 4 times 
higher for these households than for all other (non-senior, non-
indigent) households.  The larger subsidies for seniors and low 
income are due primarily to differences in rates of eligibility 
for assistance under the program; mean subsidy per qualifying 
household to the relatively small percentage of other households 
that do qualify is actually the largest of the 3 groups.  This 
finding is consistent with existing public coverage for seniors 
that requires significant cost sharing in some provinces, but 
still protects them from ruinous drug costs.  Other, non-
indigent households typically have low drug consumption, or 
relatively comprehensive insurance or both of these.  A small 
percentage, however, face very large drug costs with 
insufficient insurance coverage and would be among those who 
benefit most from the proposed program. 
 
Second, unsurprisingly, the proposed drug program would provide 
larger subsidies to residents of provinces with less 
comprehensive government drug plans.  This is particularly 
                                                 
6 While the literature suggests that drug use is quite unresponsive to changes 
in price (in most studies, the price elasticity of drug use is less than 0.3 
in absolute value), it is unclear what the effective change in drug prices 
would be under the new program.  This depends on households’ pre-program drug 
coverage and the likelihood that households exceed their annual deductible; 
the SHS data do not contain information on these parameters.   18
evident for senior households: mean subsidies for senior 
households in BC – a province with relatively low beneficiary 
cost sharing and in which a relatively high proportion of new 
drugs are listed (Grootendorst et al 2003) – are $29.  
Conversely, seniors residing in Newfoundland – a province with 
relatively high cost sharing and a restrictive formulary – would 
receive $243 on average.  These results suggest that private 
insurers are not filling the gaps in provincial drug coverage 
for seniors, or at least that seniors are not electing to 
purchase such coverage, if it exists.  
 
The same pattern exists for non-senior, non-indigent households: 
Households residing in the Atlantic provinces, where no public 
catastrophic drug coverage is available, would generally receive 
higher subsidies than would households in other provinces.  
However, the interprovincial variation in mean subsidies is not 
as large as for senior households.  And there are exceptions to 
the general relationship.  Households in New Brunswick, for 
instance, would receive lower mean subsidies ($21) than would 
households in Saskatchewan ($37), despite the fact that 
Saskatchewan has public drug coverage for this group.  This 
coverage, however, has semi-annual deductibles of $850 with 35% 
coinsurance rates, making it the least comprehensive of all the 
provincial plans.  This suggests that other factors that affect 
either drug expenditures or the take-up of private drug coverage 
varies between these provinces.   
 
Third, the proposed catastrophic drug program would deliver 
larger mean subsidies to lower income households.  The reason is 
that lower income households are much more likely to spend at 
least 3% of their income on drugs and hence be eligible for 
program benefits.  (Among eligible senior households, mean 
subsidies actually increase with household income; for non-
seniors, they are roughly independent of income.)  The income 
gradients are particularly pronounced among non-senior 
households: households in the lowest income quintile would 
receive a mean subsidy over 22 times the mean subsidy accruing 
to households in the highest income quintile.  For senior 
households, this ratio is 6.  These patterns exist despite the 
element of low-income targeting present in most provincial drug 
subsidy programs.       
 
Fourth, the cost to the federal government of having provincial 
and private insurers raise the minimum standard of drug coverage 
for all households, currently insured or otherwise, is estimated 
to be at least $461 million, not including administration and 
implementation costs.  Somewhat less than $80 million of this   19
would be offset by a reduction in outlays from the federal 
personal income tax credit for medical expenses.  If the federal 
government simultaneously eliminated the medical expense credit 
for pharmaceutical drugs, this would lead to a larger tax 
revenue offset of about $180 million. (In each case there would 
also be provincial government revenue effects as well, which 
might be as large as 50 per cent of the federal government 
effects.)  These estimates are somewhat sensitive to the 
assumption that the introduction of the scheme does not change 
total drug expenditures.  Modest percentage increases in 
household drug spending would increase estimated program costs 
by about twice the increase.  If, for example, drug expenditures 
increase by 10% under the plan, the estimated program cost would 
increase by about 20%.  Also if provincial governments change 
their plans to take advantage of a federal government 
catastrophic drug plan, this would lead to a further increase in 
the costs to the federal government although this increase would 
be correspond to a provincial government expenditure saving. 
Program costs might also increase if existing private plan drug 
insurers eliminated catastrophic coverage for their current 
enrolees, focusing instead on the provision of drug benefits 
that are excluded from the federal program.   
   20
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Appendix 1   Parameter estimates of models of probability of 
assistance and log level assistance for subsamples of senior 
households.  Results expressed as marginal effects. 
 
Seniors sample – probability of assistance 
N=3,245; Pseudo R2=0.1363 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Age – reference group: head 65-74 years 
 75+         .0551268      .01454    3.79   0.000   .026636  .083617   .457011 
Marital Status – ref group: separated/divorced/widowed/never married 
 married/cl  .1253623       .0177    7.08   0.000   .090676  .160049    .48074 
Household income quintiles – ref group: lowest quintile 
 quintile 2 -.0717771      .01604   -4.48   0.000  -.103208 -.040346   .323883 
 quintile 3 -.1357791      .01459   -9.31   0.000  -.164371 -.107187   .160863 
 quintile 4 -.1639358      .01243  -13.19   0.000  -.188297 -.139575   .081356 
 quintile 5 -.1831312      .00989  -18.51   0.000  -.202518 -.163745   .037904 
Province of residence – ref group: Ontario 
 NF          .2923679      .04937    5.92   0.000   .195603  .389132   .086903 
 PEI         .3459264      .05823    5.94   0.000   .231803   .46005   .047766 
 NS          .1588359      .04676    3.40   0.001   .067188  .250484   .096764 
 NB          .1703542      .04735    3.60   0.000   .077558  .263151   .091217 
 PQ          .3519419       .0461    7.63   0.000   .261582  .442302   .114946 
 MB          .3512155        .046    7.63   0.000   .261051   .44138   .113405 
 SK          .4848102      .04349   11.15   0.000   .399562  .570058   .110324 
 AB          .2608019      .04981    5.24   0.000   .163183   .35842   .087519 
 BC           .002182      .03778    0.06   0.954  -.071866   .07623   .128197 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Estimates are absolute changes in probability relative to reference 
group 
 
Seniors sample – log amount of assistance among eligible households 
N=667; Adj R-squared=0.0683 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Age – reference group: head 65-74 years 
 75+        -.1339454      .11052   -1.21   0.226   -.35057  .082679   .530735 
Marital Status – ref group: separated/divorced/widowed/never married 
 married/cl  .2680491      .13094    2.05   0.041   .011413  .524686   .502249 
Household income quintiles – ref group: lowest quintile 
 quintile 2  .2061544      .13275    1.55   0.120   -.05404  .466349   .362819 
 quintile 3  .1225344       .1892    0.65   0.517  -.248285  .493354   .109445 
 quintile 4  .8152435      .32685    2.49   0.013   .174624  1.45586   .028486 
 quintile 5  .6916728     1.33367    0.52   0.604  -1.92227  3.30562   .001499 
Province of residence – ref group: Ontario 
 NF          .3706546      .33555    1.10   0.269  -.287012  1.02832   .103448 
 PEI         .3562129      .35567    1.00   0.317  -.340891  1.05332   .065967 
 NS         -.1408331      .35558   -0.40   0.692  -.837759  .556092   .065967 
 NB          .0282968       .3509    0.08   0.936  -.659452  .716046   .071964 
 PQ         -.3144552      .32159   -0.98   0.328  -.944756  .315846    .16042 
 MB         -.3632317      .32153   -1.13   0.259  -.993415  .266952    .16042 
 SK           .296296      .31458    0.94   0.346  -.320271  .912863   .226387 
 AB         -.3681503      .34479   -1.07   0.286  -1.04394  .307635   .082459 
 BC         -.5007579      .41053   -1.22   0.223  -1.30539   .30387   .032984 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Estimates are proportionate changes in assistance levels relative to 
reference group 
   23
Appendix 2   Parameter estimates of models of probability of 
assistance and log level assistance for subsample of non-senior 
households.  Results expressed as marginal effects. 
 
Non-Seniors sample – probability of assistance 
N=10,842; Pseudo R2=0.1599 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Age – reference group: head < 30 years 
 30-44       .0050116      .00457    1.10   0.273  -.003954  .013977   .422247 
 45-64       .0281126       .0051    5.51   0.000   .018108  .038118   .439587 
Marital Status – ref group: separated/divorced/widowed/never married 
 Married/cl  .0075585      .00259    2.91   0.004   .002474  .012643   .665468 
Number of kids <18 – ref group: no kids 
 1-2        -.0106244      .00285   -3.73   0.000  -.016209 -.005039   .375115 
 3+         -.0023314      .00514   -0.45   0.650  -.012409  .007746   .080612 
Number of others 18+ (besides spouse) – ref group: no others 
 1-2         .0065545      .00341    1.92   0.055  -.000132  .013241   .238148 
 3+          .0220042      .02317    0.95   0.342  -.023415  .067424   .010884 
Number of full time earners – ref group: no FT earners 
 1          -.0091874      .00293   -3.14   0.002  -.014921 -.003454   .456742 
 2+         -.0095341      .00379   -2.52   0.012  -.016958  -.00211   .234366 
Household income quintiles – ref group: lowest quintile 
 Quintile 2 -.0162359      .00217   -7.47   0.000  -.020496 -.011976   .164638 
 Quintile 3  -.023011      .00244   -9.43   0.000  -.027794 -.018228   .213337 
 Quintile 4 -.0335277      .00288  -11.64   0.000  -.039173 -.027882   .235196 
 Quintile 5 -.0413135      .00323  -12.79   0.000  -.047643 -.034984   .243405 
Province of residence – ref group: Ontario 
 NF          -.004441      .00431   -1.03   0.302  -.012881  .003999   .091773 
 PEI         .0120687      .00849    1.42   0.155  -.004572   .02871    .04418 
 NS          .0037961      .00568    0.67   0.504  -.007338   .01493   .088821 
 NB         -.0014792      .00498   -0.30   0.767   -.01125  .008291   .087899 
 PQ         -.0123775      .00323   -3.83   0.000   -.01871 -.006045   .133278 
 MB         -.0045606      .00452   -1.01   0.312  -.013411  .004289   .097399 
 SK          .0023326       .0057    0.41   0.682  -.008834  .013499   .083841 
 AB         -.0010834       .0051   -0.21   0.832  -.011088  .008922   .112341 
 BC         -.0048094      .00427   -1.13   0.260  -.013178   .00356   .127744 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Estimates are absolute changes in probability relative to reference 
group 
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Non-Seniors sample – log amount of assistance among eligible 
households 
N=398; Adj R-squared=0.0640 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
variable |      dy/dx    Std. Err.     z    P>|z|  [    95% C.I.   ]      X 
---------+-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Age – reference group: head < 30 years 
 30-44       .3416574      .30167    1.13   0.257   -.24961  .932924   .201005 
 45-64       .4715962      .28227    1.67   0.095  -.081643  1.02484   .721106 
Marital Status – ref group: separated/divorced/widowed/never married 
 Married/cl  .4783135      .15048    3.18   0.001   .183378  .773249   .512563 
Number of kids <18 – ref group: no kids 
 1-2          .310458       .2041    1.52   0.128  -.089574   .71049   .180905 
 3+            .07888      .37355    0.21   0.833  -.653265  .811025   .045226 
Number of others 18+ (besides spouse) – ref group: no others 
 1-2         .1304434      .18331    0.71   0.477   -.22884  .489727   .208543 
 3+            .25647       .7817    0.33   0.743  -1.27564  1.78858   .007538 
Number of full time earners – ref group: no FT earners 
 1           .2238763      .16737    1.34   0.181  -.104157   .55191   .281407 
 2+          .2664435      .28653    0.93   0.352  -.295145  .828032   .080402 
Household income quintiles – ref group: lowest quintile 
 Quintile 2  .0171687      .18168    0.09   0.925  -.338927  .373264   .238693 
 Quintile 3  .1024055      .21227    0.48   0.630  -.313637  .518448    .18593 
 Quintile 4  .0034601      .30156    0.01   0.991  -.587582  .594502   .077889 
 Quintile 5  .283441      .36801    0.77   0.441  -.437843  1.00473   .045226 
Province of residence – ref group: Ontario 
 NF         -.1979476      .28149   -0.70   0.482  -.749662  .353767   .120603 
 PEI        -.3963131      .31445   -1.26   0.208  -1.01263  .220002   .077889 
 NS         -.0659518      .27627   -0.24   0.811   -.60743  .475527   .128141 
 NB         -.4499101      .28593   -1.57   0.116  -1.01032  .110504   .110553 
 PQ         -.5657922      .29663   -1.91   0.056  -1.14717  .015584   .090452 
 MB         -.4179198      .30393   -1.38   0.169  -1.01362  .177777   .082915 
 SK         -.4991385      .29076   -1.72   0.086  -1.06902  .070748   .100503 
 AB         -.4598791      .30812   -1.49   0.136  -1.06379  .144033   .077889 
 BC         -.8606396      .28924   -2.98   0.003  -1.42754 -.293741    .09799 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Estimates are proportionate changes in assistance levels relative to 
reference group 
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